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CHAPTER 1

CO NFLICT RESOLUTION IN
INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS
T. ST. A

TOI

E

I . I NTRODUC TION: CLASS/FICA TION OF LABOR
DISPUTES
Only about one-fifth of the American labor force is unionized. 1 With certain
important exceptions, therefore , no formal machinery exists to resolve the
various disputes that ari ·e between a majority of the country's workers and
th e ir employers. The exception , which will not be treated in detail in this
study, re late to (1) the right to organize into unions , which has been protected
in most of the private sector since 1935 by the National Labor Relations Act
and in the public secto r since the 1960s by federal law and regulation covering
U .. Government employees and by statutes in about thirty tates covering
state and municipal emp loyees; (2) the right to be free from discrimination on
such grounds as race, color, re ligion , sex, national origin, and age, which has
been guaranteed since the 1960 by federa l law and by many state statutes and
loca l ordinances; (3) the const itutional rights of public emp loyees to free
speech, due proce. s, and so on; a nd ( 4) the civil service and ' tenure' rights of
many government workers a nd school teache rs, who cannot be dismissed
except for serious cause and after appropriate procedures have been followed.
Oth erwise, th e standa rd American legal doctrine is th at an employment
arrangement of indefinite duration is a contract 'at will', which may be
I. The percentage of unioniLcd workers in the nited State, ha, declined rather ,teadily ,ince
194 7. from 2:l.9 per cen t of the total labor force in that year (33.1 per cent of nonagricultural
emp loyment) to i'l .'1 per l'L' lll toda,· (abo ut 20. 1 per cent ol 1wnagrirnltural) . S BurL·, n1 ol
Lahm Stati,tic,. l/011dhoo/.. of /,ahor S1!11is1in - / 978. Bull . No. 211110. p. :,07: S BurL·au ol
Labor Stati,tic,. l :111JJ!or11w111 //Ii(/ /:"omi11g,. Vol. .14. o. I. p. 2211 (J,muary 1'11-:7). Tho,e li gure,
ma ,k the dramatic uni!rn decline in the pri\'ate non-a)!ricultur;il ,L-ctor. IHl\\' do\\n to 15.-1 per
ce nt. Ofl\ettin!,! much ol that ha, been a ,pcctacubr growth ol unioni1ation a 111 011g !,!O\'ern111L·nt
worker,. \\hid1 ha, ,oared in the la,t quarter CL'nlllry lrom a lm o,t nothin!,! to 4.1-2 pL·r cent.
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terminated by either party at a ny time for any reason. 2 That means , in practice,
most e mployers unilate rally set all the terms a nd conditio ns of e mployment ,
a nd individual e mpl oyees have no choice but to conform or leave.
Despite th e ir re lativel y low perce ntage of the total labor fo rce. Amer ica n
unio ns exe rci se a n influence out of proportion to their numbers beca use of
the ir high concentration in fi ve key industries - heavy ma nufacturing .
constructi o n, transportation. mining , and governm en t serv ice. A me rican labor
law has tradition all y dealt. not with the relation s between emp loye rs a nd
employees as such. but with the re latio ns between unions and the employers
they ha ve orga nized or a re trying to organize. For the most part, as exe mplified
by the Nation al Labo r Relation s Act. government has on ly so ught to
circumscribe the parties' mode of combat and to lend occa ·iona l assistance ,
usua ll y upon request. in their nego ti atio ns. There has genera ll y bee n a strict
hands-off att itude toward the actual substantive terms of a ny se ttlem e nt
reached. Thus , th e Ame rican system for resol ving industrial dispu tes is
characterized by two distinctive fe a tures. vo lunt arism and diversity. o lution s
a re the product of the parties· own devising. without the interve ntion of
gove rnme nt, a nd those solutions arc as varied as the differen t industrial
settings from which they have emerged.
Labor disputes in th e United States arc ofte n classified by com me ntators
(rarely by the pa rties themselves) as in vo lving either 'interests· or 'rights'. An
' interests ' dispute , typica ll y, concerns th e substantive terms to be included in a
new co ll ective bargai ning agreement. Ordinaril y neither the unio n nor the
e mploye r can asse rt any lega l right to the provision it wishes to have incorporated in the contract; the desired cl ause would simply benefi t one pa rty at
the ex pe nse of the other. In contrast. a ' rights· dispute arises when one party
cl a im s so me e ntitleme nt under an existing agreement and t he oth e r party
contests that claim. The theory of th e moving party in this situation is tha t it has
been denied a legal right that has actually accrued or beco me vested in
accordance with the terms of th e contract. The remaind er of this study will be
devoted to a closer examination of how interest~ disputes are resolved in the
United States, most commonly thro ugh collective bargaining between union
and e mpl oyer, and how rights di sp utes arc resolved . most com monl y through
the grieva nce and arbitration process.

II . GENERAL VIEW OF INDU STR I AL RELA TIONS
A. ORGANIZATION AND OPERATION OF LABOR
UNIONS
Historica ll y, American labor has been organized a long two principal lines 2. In recent \·cars. cnurts in m ·er thirty ,ta t<:> h;1,·e uti li1.c·d \;t r1<n1, t<Ht ;111d co ntract thco ri ,·,
to qu;ilify the at-\,·i ll doctrine· . ,·,pe cia ll\· \\·hen e mpl "1·ns r,·,"rt In rc·t;tli;1ton () \" ahusiYe
,fo,chargcs of c·mplo\'\:e s for exercising sta tutor\' or ci\·il ri µ ht s m for rdusi ng to ;tet unla,\"l"ul l\'.
o r wh e n c·mplo\"l: rs assure emp loyee, nf job ,ecur it\·. abse111 · just ca use··. throug h pcrsonnc·I
manuals or in indi vid ua l inten·ic ws.
g<'11,•r,tl/_1· \\'. ll o ll ,>wa\" ,\: i\,I. Leec h . l·."111p/m·111<·111
T<'n11i11/lliu11: Righ1.1· //Iii/ R,·11wt!il'., ( i ')K:i ): 11. l'crr it. /-."1111dor ,·,· i)irn1i.1.rn/ L /1 1< ' a11il l'mclin•
( 19K-l).

S,·,·
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according to the skill ·. cra ft. o r occ upa tion o f th e work e rs (' horizo nt al'
organization). or acco rdin g to the particula r indu stry in which the work e rs a re
e mpl oyed ('ve rtical' o rganiza ti o n). The ea rli est American trade union s, which
sprang up in th e I 790s in th e m ajor citie s a lon g the Atlantic seaboard, we re
craft-based and consisted of such skilled labo re rs as shoem a kers, printe rs, and
carpenters. By the 1860s th e loca l craft unions had begun to form nation al craft
unions , man y o f which surv ive to th e prese nt day. In 188 1, to reduce inte runio n
conflict and to ce ntrali ze political activiti es. a numbe r of na ti onal craft uni o ns
established the precursor of th e American Federation of La bor (AFL).
Significantl y. th e craft unions were o rga ni zed from the bottom up. and even
now their ce nter o f gravi ty. the locus o f powe r fo r collective bargaining and
other da y-t o-day ope ration s. is genera ll y lodged in the local rather than the
na tiona l unio n .
A quite di ffe re nt patt e rn is fo und a mo ng the grea t industri a l uni o ns th at
grew o ut o f th e c w Deal era of the 1930s a nd o rganized th e large ly un skill ed
or se miskill ed wo rk e rs o f such mass-production industries as stee l. a utomobiles. an d e lectrical equipment. In con ·iderable part th ese unions were the
creation o f a d iss ident g roup of AFL leade rs who broke away and ultim a te ly
founded a riva l fe de rati o n. the Cong ress of Indu strial Orga nizat io n (C IO).
From th e start the na ti o nal industrial unions exe rcised more power th an the ir
counterpa rt'> a mo ng th e craft unions. Typica ll y. fo r exa mpl e , it is th e natio nal
union th a t nego ti a tes the long. complex collective agreeme nt wi th some
natio n-wid e. multi-plant manufacturing company which sett les mo t basic
issues of co mpe nsati o n . fringe benefits, a nd th e like . Local industria l uni o ns,
usually re prc~e nting the emp loyees of a single plant, then execute supp le menta ry contracts covering a much narrowe r range of loca l mat ters. Local
personnel. howeve r. a lso have prim a ry respon sibi lit y for ad mini stering th e
national a !.(ree mcnt a t the plant leve l.
True to its o riginal mission. th e now-me rged American Federation of Labor
a nd Con g re ~s of Industria l Organizations (AFL- C IO) has very litt le direct
invol vem e nt in collective bargai llin g. Its primary functions re main · to serve as
organized la bor's ch ie f political vo ice a nd to curb inte rnecine warfare ove r
me m be rs a nd jobs. Unl ik e the more ce nt ra lized labor federat ions of Weste rn
Europe. th e A FL-C IO docs no t formulate ge ne ral po licy for its co nstitu e nt
na tion al union s. Beneat h the nation al AFL-CIO a rc sta te a nd city federations.
The ir prin cipal tasks are po litica l a nd education al, alth ough city bodies
occasionall y play a significa nt ro le in rall ying public support for a major local
strike .
A lt ogether. there arc about 19.3 milli o n union me mbe rs and represented
cmp lo _ccs in the Un it ed States. Th ey a re di vided a mong more th a n 150
nati ona l and 50.000 loca l uni o ns. althou!!h th e te n lar!!CSt na ti o nal s ha ve ove r
half th e entire membership. Yet th e total la bo r forZe now numbe rs almost
100 million. so th a t th e o rga nized portion has dipped to abo ut 20 per cent.
less th a n half the proportionate strengt h in Weste rn E urope. A primary ca use
for th e decl in e in uni o n adherence is the shift in employment from th e ·b lueco lla r· to th e ·w hit e-collar· sectors of the econo my . a nd th e co ntinuin g fa ilure
to en list worke rs in th e office. clerical. techni ca l. and similar se rvice tra des .
Privat e e mploye rs · o pposition to unioniza tion a lso intensifi ed sharp! _ in th e
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1970s and l 980s. But th e re has bee n dramatic progress in orQa ni zing public
e mployees . includin g schoo l teache rs. during th e past two decades. If this
should presage a resurge nce of union growth. especially amon g white co llar
workers. it could also foreshadow a ·ubstantial change in th e pattern of union
structure a nd operatio ns ou tlined above. The combination of better ed ucated
emp loyee and small e r. less ce ntralized e mployers cou ld place renewed
e mphasis o n th e local union and its autonom y in th e bargaining process.

B . EMPLOYERS' ORGANIZATION
Americans are a nation of joine rs. and of no group i this true r tha n busines
people. On e of the largest and most importa nt bu sin ess associ a tion is the US
Chamber of Commerce, a federation of some 3,000 local a nd state chambers of
commerce and 1.000 trade and professional association s . with an underlying
membership of 5 million busin ess firms and individu a ls . Every significan t
industry boasts at least one trade association. Man y of these organizations
pla y an influential role in politics. ed ucation . and even eco no mic and sc ie ntific
research. Yet despite their numbers and importance. such bodi es have almost
nothing directly to do with th e resoluti o n of industrial disputes through
collective bargaining or otherwise.
Most American employers, when confronted with a union demand for
recognition and bargaining, respond on a wholly individua l basis. In any event,
both in organizational struggles and in subsequent contract negotiations, the
u ual practice is for the parties to go one-on-one - a sing le e mployer against a
ingle union. This prototyp ical situation is een mo t ofte n when the e mployer
is a relative ly small company with only one plant or shop .
If the company is a large nation al firm with many pla nt s, its a rrangements for
collective bargaining become more complica ted . A indicated ea rlier, it is
standard procedure for the company 's top official to sign a master contract
with the national union covering basic items a t all pl a nts, a nd then leave to the
plant managements the task of working out local supplements with the various
local unions. But that is only part of the story. Num ero us va riation exist from
one industry to another.
In the steel industry , for example, all th e major companie have tended to
bargain simultaneo usly with th e union . A se ttlem ent. however. was usually
made first with only one of th e m. the dominant USX. rormcrlv U S Steel.
Co rporation . That settl e ment set the pattern for agreements with the other
companies. with the possibility of so me slight variation in terms. In the mid1980s adverse eco no mi c conditions in the steel industrv led manal!ement to
depa rt from its customary coordinated barga inin g. with ~ac h compa71y inst ead
going its own way in negotiation s. On the o th er hand. in the auto industry
se rious negotiations generally tak e place between just one compa ny and the
union at a time. The ·target" for bargaining (and a possib le strike) is chosen
by th e union. Once a co ntract is reac hed with that company. the union
atte mpts to conclude simil ar agreements with the other firms. That traditional
format may be breaking down in autos. howeve r. under the pressure of st iffer
foreign and domestic competition.
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Employers in the construction a nd printing industries, and in other industries
marked by small firms in fi erce ly competitive local markets , organize very
differentl y for collective bargaining. Typically, they will form local employers'
association s and negotiate a a unit with the corresponding local unions having
jurisdiction over a designated craft or class of workers in a particular local
market. Th e local em ploye rs' associations may in turn be affiliated with a
national organization. Ordinarily, however, these national bodies perform only
a minor function in ongoing collective bargaining. For instance, they may
simply sign a contract with the appropriate national craft union agreeing that all
member of the ir loca l affi liates will accept the area standards or working
conditi on spe lled out in the app licable local contract.

C. EXC LUSIVE REPRESENTATION AND THE
APPROP RIATE BARGAINING U IT
Central to an unde r ta nding of th American system of industrial relations a nd
collective bargaining are the two interrelated concepts of exclusive represe ntation and the appropriate bargaining unit. In slightly different form they appear
in both th e a tio nal Labor Re lations Act ( LRA) , which applies to most
employees in firms of a ny substantial size, a nd in the Railway Labor Act
(RLA) , which appli es to e mployee in the railroad and airline indu tries. An
'appropri a te bargai nin g unit' refe rs to a plant, shop, department, or other
admini t ra tive divi ion of a company in which there is ·ufficient community of
interest among the employee th at it is deemed suitable for defining the
bound aries of union representation and bargaining. Once a union ha ecured
the suppo rt of a majority of th e e mployees in an appropriate unit , either
through a secret-ba llot vote conducted by the National Labor Relations Board
(under th e NLRA) or through an informal poll of the workers , the union
becomes the exclusive bargaining representative of all the employee in that
unit , adherents and dissenter a like.
The impo rtance of this status a exclusive bargaining agent, almost unique to
American law, ca n ha rdly be exaggerated. When a union has been so installed,
an employer is obliga ted to bargain with it in good faith concerning all wages,
hours, and othe r terms a nd conditions of employment in the unit. The
employe r may not unilaterally change any aspect of working conditions
without prior bargaining. Any collective agreement negotiated by the union
supe rsedes the con trary terms of all existing individual contracts of hire. and
se ts th e exact e mployment sta ndards (not merel y the minimum standards)
that \ ill preva il in the bargaining unit. The emp lo er ma 1101 ne go tiate
·eparat e l_ (without rarely grant ed union co nse nt) for differen t terms eve n
with a willing emp loyee. and of course it ma y 11 0 1 recogni ze or negotiate in
any way with another labor organization regarding th e same unit.
To counterba lance the enormou power of exclusive represe nta tion , the US
Supreme ourt has declared that a majority union is ubj ect to an implied
tatutory duty of fair representation .3 That means the union must spea k and act
3. Vaca v. Sipes. 386 US 17 1. 191 ( I 967): Hi11e.1· v.Anch o r M oror FreiNhl. In c. . -1 2-1
( 1976).

S 554 . 570
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for all employees in good faith, without invidious di scrimination o r arbitrariness. It may not distinguish among workers because of race or sex or personal
hostility, or because so me support the union and others oppose it. In
administering the grievance and arbitration machine ry, the union must make
decisions as to the merits of particular grievances, and not ignore an employee's
complaint or process them in a perfunctory mann e r.
Although representation e lections may have been he ld plant by plant in a
given company, the employer and union may ofte n agree on company-wide
negotiations for a master contract, or even agree on joint negoti ations covering
severa l companies. In such instances the actual negoti a ting unit will exceed the
original election unit, and any contract that is conclude d will apply to the
expanded unit. A ll told. there arc approximately 150.000 co ll ccti c bargaining
agreements in the United States . The vast maj o rit y cove r just one emp loyer
and a sma ll number of workers. But 1.968 ( 1.360 pr iva te sector) major
contracts cover o ne thousand or more worke rs each. a nd acco unt for 8.8 (6.5
private sector) million employees in all.
The rul e of excl usive representation preclude a nyth ing in American
industrial relations directly analogous to the works co uncil s of Europe,
separate and apart from the majority union. The Labo r-Manage ment Reporting and Disclosure Act of 195 9 nonetheless does much to e n ure that both loca l
and natio nal union s will be responsive to their me mbe r hips. Most rank-andfile American union workers seem assured , at least indirectl y through the right
to vote regularly for union officials and often directl y th rough their participation in the ratification of local and nation al cont ract , that they will have a
significant voice in determining the nature of th e ba rga in s truck with their
employer by the labor organ iza tions representin g the m.
Ill . INTER ESTS DISPUTES AND COLLEC T IV E
BARGAINING
A. BARGA!
I. I

G DUTIES A
THE PRIV A T E SE

D

UES

TOR

The legal framework for collective bargaining in mo t A merican industry is
provided by section 8(d) of the NLRA , which imposes o n an e mployer and a
union representing its employees the ' mutual obligati o n . .. to . . . confer in
good faith with respect to wages, hours, and oth e r te rm s and conditions of
employmen t'. Sweeping as is this mandate , it i imm e dia tely qu a lified by the
important caveat that 'such obligation does not compe l e ithe r party to agree to
a proposal or require the ma king of a concession'. Refu sa l by either e mployer
or union to bargain collectively as required by the law is a n 'unfair labor
practice' under the NLRA. It i subject to an orde r to ba rgain from the NLRB,
enforceable in the federal courts of appea l . Section 2. First. of the RLA which
governs the railroad and airline industrie , mak es it th e duty of carriers and
their employees ' to exert every reasonable effort to make and maintain
agreements concerning rates of pay, rules. and working co nditions' , and section
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2, Ninth , obligates a carrier to 'treat with' the duly certified representative of its
employees . Carriers covered by the RLA have traditionally been far more
amenable to collective bargaining than other employers, and no administrative
agency was created to remedy violations of that statute. When necessary ,
enforcement is sought directly through a court action.
The responsibility of the Labor Board under the NLRA to ensure bargaining
in 'good faith' concerning 'wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of
employment' probably grants to a government agency a power unparalleled in
Western industrial society to police the ongoing negotiations of employers and
unions . Yet the underlying premise of the NLRA is freedom of contract.
According to the US Supreme Court, the Act is designed 'to promote industrial
peace by encouraging the making of voluntary agreements'.• Thus, although the
NLRB is charged with refereeing the process of bargaining, the Board is strictly
precluded from atte mpting to regulate the substantive terms of the parties'
ultimate agreeme nt.
This ten sion between overseeing the process and keeping hands off the
results has plain ly troubled the Labor Board in its determination of whether
parties have barga ined in 'good faith '. That issue can hardly be resolved
without examin ing the entire course of negotiations, including offers, rejections, countcrproposals, and final outcome. But it is symptomatic of the
probl em that the NLRB has never sq uarely decided whether an employer may,
after a careful, syste matic assessment of employee desires and its own financial
capacity , put together a total contractual package and present it to the union on
a 'take-it-or-leave-it ' basis. 5 The Board and the Supreme Court have declared
that good faith bargaining means more than 'going through the motions of
negoti ating'. Collective bargaining connotes a 'shared process' and there must
be a 'serious intent to adjust differences and to reach an acceptable common
ground '.
More basically there is a question whether a statutory duty to bargain in good
faith can eve r amount to more than an earnest expression of hope. As recently
as 1961 a disting uished group of labor economists and industrial relations
experts branded the requirement ' unrealistic' , adding that 'provisions designed
to bring "good fait h" have become a tactical weapon used in many situations as
a means of harassment' .6 Other evidence suggests, however, that the statute
has had a salutary impact, with widespread voluntary compliance by both
man agem e nt and labor. Thus, one survey showed that successful bargaining
relation shi p were eventually established in 75 per cent of the cases sampled
th at went throug h to a final Board order, and in 90 per cent of the cases that
were sett led after the issuance of a complaint. 7 Nonetheless, at the present time
4. NLRB \. A 111erica11 National !11sura11ce Co .. 3-B US 395. 40 I ( 1952) .
5. Scc. e.R .. Ce11eml Electric Co .. 150 LRB 192 ( 1964) .enforced. 418 F.2d 736 (2d Ci r. 1969).
cert. denied . 397 U S 965 ( 1970).
6. Labor Study Group. n,e Puhlic Interest i11 National Labor Policy 82 ( 196 1).
7. P. Ro,,. Th e Covem111e11 t as a So urce of Union Power 180-2:l0 ( 1965) : McCulloch. ·The
D.:v.: lopm ent ot Admin istrative R.:medi.:s'. 14 Lahor La11· J1111rnal :tN. 348 ( ll)(,3). A r.:ce·nt
studv prnduc.:d 1nuc h k,s reassuring ligur.:s. indicatin g that an .:111plov.:r", unla\\'ful rdu,al to
harg;1 in in an organi Lin g si tuation reduced th.: likelihood or an e , ·cn tual co ntr;1ct to about .'ill per
cent. C<loke. ·The· Fa ilure· lo Nq!otiatc First Contracts: Determinants a nd P<ll1c,· lm plic1lions·.
38 /11dmtrial and Lai>or lfrlatio11s !?<Tin,·. 1(,3. lh4. 170. 174--17.'i ( 11)8.'i).
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a recalcitrant employer willing to stand the heat of public opinion ca n forestall
negoti atio n for several yea rs. Eve ntua lly it will be subject to a judicia lly
enfo rceable o rde r to bargain, but in the meantime th e employees will be de ni ed
the fruit of any contract that good fa ith negotiations might have prod uced . The
NLRB has repeatedly refused union requests for a 'make whole' monet a ry
remedy in these circumstances, even when the employer's viola tion is ' cl ea r
and flagrant' .
Ordinarily, the inquiry into the parties' good faith in bargaini ng call s for a
judgment about their subjective state of mind: did they approach negotiations
with a n appropriate attitude toward accommodating differences and reaching
agree me nt? In two important in sta nces, however, a party (usuall y the
empl oyer) may be guilty of a refusal to bargain despite a genu ine desire to
conclude a contract. As one example, an employer is obligated witho ut rega rd
to its menta l se t to furnish such data as wage rates, job classifications, a nd a ll
other information necessa ry and relevant to the performance of the union 's
collective ba rga ining responsibilities. This applies to the adm inistration as well
as the negotiation of the la bor contract. Second, once a union has become th e
e mployees' exclusive representative, an employer may not make any unilatera l
change in wages, hours, or working conditions until it has first bargained
concerning the matter to the point of 'impasse', a dead lock or breakdown in the
negotiations. This is true even though no contract may be in effect at the tim e
the e mpl oyer wishes to introduce th e change.
What constitutes 'wages, hours , and other terms and co nditions of employme nt' within the meaning of section 8( d) of the Nation al Labor Relations Act is
a critica l issue. If an ite m is classified as one of these a-ca ll ed ' ma ndatory'
subj ects of bargaining, either party is required to bargain about it at the behest
of the other, and either party may refuse to contract at all absent agree ment on
that ite m. Other items, termed 'permissive' subj ects of barga ining, typically
involve managerial prerogatives or internal union affairs. So long as they are
not unl awful , the parties may voluntarily bargain and contract concerning
the m. But ne ither party may insist o n bargaining over uch nonmandatory
topics if the other party objects. There has been a continuing debate about how
the NLRB and the courts should draw th e line between ' mandatory' and
' permissive' subjects, and even about whether a government age ncy should
have the power to tell union s a nd employer when they may and may not
de mand bargaining.
' Wages' have been held to e ncompa s compensation in almost every
conceivable form. Thus, there must be bargaining upon request not only about
sa laries or hourly earnings but also abo ut pensions, vacation pay, overtime and
other premium rates, health and life in sura nce, stock purchase plans, Christmas bonuses, employee discounts on purchases from the employer, and many
other types of remuneration. ' Hours' include not only the total number of
ho urs to be worked in a day o r a week but also the sched uling of shifts, the
allocation of overtime, a nd the like. Working 'conditi ons' obviously refer to
such factors as heat , cold, light, noise, dirt, and ment al or physical stress and
train. In addi tion . by itself or in co njun ction with ·wages· and ·hours· . the
phrase 'terms an d cond iti o ns· may cove r a wide range of miscellaneous matte rs.
including sen ior ity. job classifications. hiring refe rral syste ms. promotions and
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disciplin e. grieva nce a nd arbitrati o n procedures. uni o n securit y provi. io ns.
and no-stri ke cla uses.
In rece nt yea rs th e most controversial issue concerning the duty to bargain
has been th e ex tent to which e mployers must negotiate about managerial
decision s th at res ult in a shrinkage of employee job opportunities. Th e LRB
for a long time he ld that in th e a b e nce of antiunion a nimus , manage ment did
not have to barga in ove r decision s to subcontract, relocate operations, or
introduce technological improve me nts, although it did have to ba rgain about
the effects of uch actio ns o n th e employees displaced. Layoff schedules,
severance pay. and tra nsfe r rights we re thus bargainable , but the basic decision
to disco ntinue a n o pera ti o n wa no t. During th e Kennedy-Johnson administratio n of the 1960 , howeve r, th e La bor Board reclassified a whol e range of
managerial decisio n as ma nd ato ry subj ects of bargaining. Th ese included
decisions to term in ate a de pa rtm e nt and subcontract its wo rk , to consolidate
o perati o ns thro ugh a uto mate d te chniques, and to close one plant of a
multi-pl ant ente rpri e .
Th e US upre me Court has a pproved om e of these deve lo pme nts and
disapproved others. For exa mple, it sustain ed a bargaining order when a
manu facturer wi hed to ubcont ract out its maintenance wo rk .8 The Court
e mph a ized this did not a lter the company s basic o pe rati o n', o r require any
'capital in estment'. T he re wa me re ly a re pl ace ment of o ne group of
empl oyee with ano th e r gro up to do the sa me work in th e same pl ace under the
sa me ge neral superv ision . Ba rga ining would not 'significa ntl y abridge' the
e mpl oyer's 'freedom to manage th e busin ess' . On th e o the r ha nd , a maintenance firm d id no t have to ba rgain whe n it decided to te rminate an
unpro fit ab le contract to p rovide ja nitoria l services to a nursing ho me.9 The
Court first stated broadl y th at a n e mployer has no duty to barga in about a
decisio n ·t o shut down part o f its business purely for econ o mic reaso ns'. But it
th en po inted out th at in this pa rticular case th e ope ration was not be ing moved
e lsewhere and th e laid-off e mployees were not going to be replaced, the
e mpl oyer's disp ute with th e nur ing home conce rn ed the size of a manage ment
fee over which the union had no control, and th e uni o n had just rece ntly been
ce rtified and thu the re wa no di sruption of an ongo in g re lati o nship . Th at
leaves un answered many que tio ns regarding th e more typica l in tance of a
pa rti a l closin!! nr th e remova l of a plant to a new locati o n. 1"
Impos in g a d uty to ba rga in about ' manageri al' decisions would obviously
de lay proceedi ngs, impair business flexibility , and pe rhaps interfere with the
confide nt ia lity of negoti ati o ns with third partie . Ofte n ba rga inin g would be
doomed in ad ance a a futile exe rci se. Noneth eles , it is a rguable th at not even
8. Firehoard /'aper Prod11c1s Corp. ,.

L R/3 . 379 S 203 (196-1) .
9. Fir.II mio1111/ ,\1ai111e11a11ce Corp . , . 1 L R/3 . -152
666 ( 198 1).
Ill. T he ,<H.:alkd · Reaga n Board· read Firs/ ,\ 'a1io1111/ ,\lai111e111111n' hroad l, . 11 t hL· emplowr",
deci,io n ·turned upon a (fu nda me ntal'') c ha ngL' in the natu re a nd (or'.' ) d irect io n of the hu, in L·"··
:ind la bo r co,ts \\'ere not the ·1110,t impo rt a nt co n, id crat io n·. ii \\'a, n,>1 a 111:1nd:11on ,uhjLTI ol
ba rga in ing . ()Ii, l :krn1or Co . . 2(,l) L R B X91 ( 198-1) (re loca tio n and con,olidatio n ol outdated
resea rch faciht~ ): (,'ar \\'ood- Oe1mi1 Eq11ip11u•111. 27-1 1LRB 113 ( l'JS)) (,uhco ntracting):
ll all'ilwm ,\ frllodr. Inc.. ].7)
LRB 3.'\9 ( 191-i)) (rl'location of tkliwr\' op.:r:111on,) . But cf.
l .i11011 S\'\11' 111.1. 2X3.
I.RB o. 1-1-1. 12) L RR M l(IXI ( llJX7) (r.: lm:ation ol pmdul'tion hel'au,.:
o f la bo r co,1,).
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the e mploye r's legitimate regard for profitm akin g nor th e public's ju tified
concern for a productive economy should totally ove rri de th e worke rs' cl aim to
a voice in the decisions of continuin g ente rpri ses th at will vita lly a ffect their
future e mployme nt opportunities. Occasiona ll y, negotiatio ns will produce a
less dra. tic ol utio n th an a shutdown or a rel ocat ion. At the very least
barga ining may se rve a th era peutic purpose. As th e Supreme Co urt ha put it ,
the La bor Act ' was framed with an awarene ·s that refusal to confer and
nego tiat e had bee n o ne of th e mos t prolific causes of imlu-,trial stri re·. 11

2.

TH E P

BLI C SECTOR

Co ll ect ive barga ining in the publ ic sector came after and bu ilt upon the
experie nce of bargaining in th e private sector. Before 1960 co ll ective
barga inin g was almost unheard of a mo ng civil ser ants. A few import ant
empl oyee associations ex iste d at both the federal and ~tate levels. most notab ly
in the postal se rvice and education. but th ey were primarily e ngaged in social.
professio nal , and political activities , including lobbying for favorab le legislation . There wa s eve n a fundam enta l conce ptua l objection to a ny notio n of
collective barga inin g in the public sector. T he stat e was 'sove reign ', an d it
would be a n unconstitutional de lega tion o f power for it to share deci ionmaking with any nongove rnmental body. But these theoretica l barriers
eve ntua ll y buckl ed unde r the pressure of such practical forces as th e rapidly
growing numbers and increasin g milita ncy of government workers. In 1962
Preside nt Kenn edy by executive order gave federal emp loyees modified
bargaining rights, and th e e were codifi ed by Congre~s in the Civ il Se rvice
Reform Act of 1978 . During th e I 960s a nd I 970s over thirty state·, through
comprehensive legislati on o r otherwi. e, gra nted the right to barga in to o ne or
more classes of state or municipa l e mployees. In deed. o er these two decades
the public secto r was by fa r the most rapidl y expanding area of unionization in
the United State . By 1980 about half of th e approximately IO mi lli o n fu ll-time
state and local workers and nearly 60 pe r cent of the approxima tely 21 million
federa l workers were organized.
At present , state law is ex clusive in governing collective negotiations in the
p ublic se rvice at the state leve l. There cou ld be a consti tutinnal question
whether the US Congres would have th e power to regulate ba rga ining o n th e
part of the sove reign state governments. oneth e le s, it has been he ld that
state e mployees possess a federal constitut ion al right to orga ni ze into unions.
Bargaining in the public sector differs ignificantl y from that in the private
sector in several respects. First, abo ut te n states do not requi re true collective
negotiations in the sense of bargainin g in good fa ith to th e po int of impasse .
They mere ly direct public agencies to ' meet and confer' w ith representatives of
the e mployees and to entertain th eir views and sugge tions. The public
employer retains full power of unilatera l decision. Second . th e subject-matter
of negotia tion varies con siderably. The fede ral governmen t and a number of
states pecifically exclude a range of manageria l prerogatives a nd even such
11. Fire/){)11rd P1111er l'roi/11u., Corp. v. N l, R 8, 379 US ~o:1.

~
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matte rs a retireme nt benefits from th e scope of bargaining. Quite a few
jurisdictions also subordinate th e duty to bargain to all or pa rt of the merit
systems administered by civi l e rvice commissions, which typically control
appointments, pro motio ns, a nd compen ation. Moreove r, under federal law
manda tory barga inin g does no t reach items that are the subject of a
government-wide rul e or regulation. It has been estimated that federal
employee have the right to bargain o n on ly about a fourth as many subj ects a
worker in the private ector.
At th e same time, public employm e nt encompasses a disproportionately
large number of professio nal per o nn e l, such as school teachers, who have a
professional's interest in th e nature a nd qu alit y of th eir output. This mea ns, for
example, that a teachers' unio n is like ly to see k bargaining over matters
analogou s to those a production workers' union would ord in aril y be conte nt to
leave to man ageme nt 's discretio n . Thus, the teac he rs will be concerned about
the curriculum. instructio nal materia ls, the school calendar, cl ass size, tude nt
disciplin e. and so on. State co urts a nd la bo r relation s agencies have diverged in
cl assifying such items as mandatory, permi ·sive, or eve n prohibited subj ects for
bargaining. although a substantial majority has ruled aga in st a broad ex te nsion
of the public emp loyer' duty to bargai n. In addition. except in a small handful
of states. public employee are forb idde n by statute or common law to engage
in stri kes. slowdowns, or imilar concerted activity in support of the ir
bargaining demands.

B . LO

S FOR BA R GA IN!

G ON VARIOU

ISSUES

As indi cated ea rlier the site o r le ve l for bargainin g on th e vario us issues
between th e union and e mpl oyer differs markedl y from firm to firm and from
indu stry to industry. For emp loyees in a la rge multipl a nt company e ngaged in
mass produ ction, the mos t importa nt contract will be th e na ti o nal agreeme nt
nego ti ated between their parent union and the company. Th a t will genera ll y
co er \ age rates. job classifica ti o ns , enio rity. promotions and layoffs,
grievances and arbitra tion, pensions a nd in suran ce, and other frin ge benefits.
Frequently on ly matters of stri ctl y loca l conce rn , such as vacat ion priorities o r
shift schedules, a nd perhaps refinements o r cl arifications of th e national
agreement to meet particul ar loca l needs, are left fo r bargaining at th e
indi vidual plant leve l. Other times, important ite m · th a t te nd to vary from
region to region, such a · wage rates . wi ll a lso be cove re d by the loca l
supplements. Of course, if the employe r is a small company with only o ne plant,
a single contract coveri ng a ll iss ue will be nego ti ated, u ua ll y by th e local union
with or without th e as ista nce of a re prese ntative from th e nation al orga nizati on . In more decentra lized industries, such as con tru cti o n , printing, retailing,
and the ser ice trad es genera ll y. th e principal and ofte n the so le agreeme nt will
be concluded at the local leve l. The nation al contract. if a ny, may be just a few
paragraphs . It wi ll probably no t dea l with specific s ubsta nti ve terms of
e mpl oyment, but rat her with th e unde rlying obligatio ns of th e parties and their
loca l affiliates to recognize a nd bargain wit h each other, a nd to accep t and
abid e by app li cab le local agreeme nts.
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At e ith e r the natio nal o r local level both e m p loye r a nd union will be
re prese nted by negoti ating tea ms. The unio n' negoti atin g committee is
elected by the me mbe rship or a ppointed by the unio n p reside nt or executive
boa rd. It will comm o nl y be hea de d by the unio n pre ·ide nt o r local business
ma nage r, but occas ion all y by a committee ch ai rperso n . T he e mployer's side
will ge ne rally con ist of offici a l · a nd staff fro m t he perso nn e l de pa rtment. In
ma ll compa nies th e chie f executive officer may participate actively. In la rger
firm th e vice preside nt fo r industria l rel a tio ns will be the chief negoti a to r.
Especi a lly at the nati o nal le e l both lawye rs a nd economists may be in volved a t
th e ba rga ining ta ble o r behind th e cenes. In complex negotia ti ons the re ma
also be unio n-e mpl oye r subco mmittees to work on particular is ue . Afte r a
te nta tive agree me nt ha bee n reached by the negotiators, it ofte n ha to be
ra tified by the union's me mbe rship and the corporation'. board o f directo r .
In the public sector, most negoti a tion s ta ke p lace at the . tate o r municip al
leve l. Th a t na turally diminishes the barga ining significa nce o f the nation a l
unio n. A special concern o f the public e mp loyer is avo idin g an undu e
proliferation of bargaining unit . A state o r a la rge city wil l have th ousand s o f
e mployees spread across m a ny de pa rtm e nt and job classifi cati o ns a nd
freque ntl y across hundreds o f mil es as we ll. If bargaining oppo rtunities we re
max imized in small , rela ti ve ly co hes ive units for all these various gro ups. the
re ult co uld be an administ rati ve night mare for the state o r muni cip al
gove rnme nt. Ofte n, the refo re, the publi c emplo_er will seek broad occupati ona l units cutting across depa rtmental lines. That will faci litate ba rga inin g
abo ut uch major. governm e nt-wide iss ues a: job classifications, wage sca les,
and re tire me nt progra ms, but th e ve ry size of th e units may hinde r unionization
o r require the inclusion of di parate a nd some ti mes antago ni stic groups of
e mpl oyee., such as docto rs, la wye rs, a nd nurses. Furthermore, gove rnme ntwide unit. will ma ke it so mewh a t awkwa rd to deal with narrow departme ntal or
o ffi ce iss ue , like va catio n prio rities a nd shift schedules. T hese co mpe tin g
con ·idera ti ons have led to a wide ra nge of approache . . from ta tuto rily
pre cribe d ba rga ining unit to tota ll y ad hoc determination .

. A C ILLARY B A R GA !
M E DI A TIO , FA C T- F I N D!

I

G PRO

G. AD

EDU R ES RB IT R A TION

If a uni o n a nd an employer a re un a bl e to settl e th e ir own differe nces, they may
see k he lp from outside to brea k th e impa se. Or. if the disp ut e has significant
public ramifications , and especiall y if it a ri . cs in the pub li c sector. a
gove rnm e nt agency may inte rvene o n it s ow n initiative. T he fi rst steps are
like ly to be conciliation o r med iati o n. T hese terms are now u ed almost
inte rch a ngea bly in the United Sta tes, alth o ugh co nciliation co nn o tes the most
in fo rm a l a nd least intrusive a rt o f o utsider in vo lvemen t. In both mediation
and concilia tion a knowledgeable a nd dipl o matic th ird pa rty a tte mpts to win the
trust of th e two sides, to unde rsta nd the ir pro bl e ms a nd positi o ns. to serve as a
mutu a l co nfid ant a nd go-be twee n. and freque ntl y to sugges t new ave nues for
expl o ra ti o n. Th e objective is to ge t e mpl oye r and uni o n to resolve th e di spute
th e mse lves, no t to provide a ready- made so lu tio n . Most medi a ti on is per-
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formed by full -time profes io na l ta ffs mainta in ed by the Federal Mediation
and Concili a tion Service a nd th e vario us sta te la bor re lations agencies.
In the publ ic sector two othe r proced ure a re often available if mediation or
conci liation is unsuccess ful. O ne is called 'fact-finding '. A · th e name implies,
this involves brin ging in a n outside r to inve tigate and report on the facts of a
dispute in the hope that publicity will put press ure on th e pa rties to reach a
settlement. The investigatio n m ay consist of a fairly for ma l hearing with
witnesses, documentar ev ide nce. a nd briefs. It has been debated whe the r
fact-finders should attempt mediation a t some point or retain a more j udicia l
stance th roughout the proceed in g. In a ny event th e re now see ms a consensus
that the most effective approach includes ma kin g specific recommendations o n
the issues in dispute. a nd no t me re ly ma king findin g of fact. In true
fact-finding, however, a ny recommend a ti o n a re advisory o nl y a nd not lega lly
binding o n uni on or e mployer.
The lack of legal enforceability is wh a t la rge ly distinguishes fact-fi nding from
' interest' arbitration. evern l state have leg islation providing for final a nd
binding arbitration as the la t step in reso lving impa e invol ving certain
classes of emplo ces, mo. t commonl y police a nd firefighters. Proced ura lly,
arbitration resembles fact-finding, a lth oug h it m ay be so me wh a t more formal.
There i often a tripartite panel. with a de legate from both union and employer
and an impa rti al cha irper o n who h as th e decisive vote. Custo m a ril y the tatute
sets forth certain sta ndards to be ap plied by th e arbitra ti o n pa nel in it
deliberati ons. These ordinaril y includ e th e cost of li ving, the public e mploye r'
ability to pay, and the public inte res t ge nerall y. but as a practica l ma tte r th e
most important criteria a re th e co ntract settl e ments a mong comparable
e mpl oyees in comparab le co mmuniti es. Sometimes th e a rbitration is ope ne nded in that the panel is not limited to a ny particular te rm s in its awa rd ; ome
statutes co n fine the panel to a choice be twee n th e ' la t be t offe rs' of union and
e mp loyer, either as a tota l package o r o n a n iss ue-by- iss ue bas is. Unlike
med iato rs, arbitrators as wel l as fact-finders a re usuall y a ppo inted for a given
ca e a nd arc not permanen t civil se rvants .
In th e private sector. Ame rica n e mployers a nd union s a lik e have traditio na ll y opposed arbitra tion as a mea ns of settling ' inte rests' disputes. They have
bee n parti c ul arly ada mant against . a-called 'co mpul so ry' a rbitration imposed
by law, a nd here they ha e prevai led exce pt in uch ra re in sta nces as two major
ra il road disputes in th e 1960s. In recent years. howeve r, a fe w e mpl oye rs a nd
unio ns have become more receptive to vo luntary reso rt to a rbitratio n to fix the
te rm s of new contracts in th e eve nt negoti a ti o n break down. And in the 1970s
the stee lworkers depa rted s ha rpl y from pa st practi ce by agree ing in adva nce to
experim e nt with th e a rbit ra ti o n of un settl ed is. ues when the ir co ntracts
expired.

D. EME RGE

CY PRO CE DURE

T he Taft-Hartley Act of 1947 authorized th e Attorne General to seek a n
80-day fe d era l injun cti o n aga inst a strik e o r locko ut when th e Pre ident
co nc ludes. after rece iving the repo rt of a board of inquiry, th a t a work stoppage
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would ' imperil the national health or safety'. During the last twenty days before
the injunction expires the NLRB must conduct a secret vote among the
employees to ee wheth er they will accept the employer's fin al offe r. This latter
procedure has proved a waste of time, since the offe r is in va riably rejected, and
it may impede eleventh-hour negotiations. The board of inquiry cannot make
recommendations , which might enable it to rally pu blic o pini o n behind a fair
settlement. Finall y, there is no provision for ultim ate reso lutio n of the dispute
once the 80-day injunction is dissolved . That ve ry e le ment of uncertainty,
however, might be a spur to voluntary accord .
The absence of a definitive legislative so luti on may a lso refl ect the reality
that in today's world a genuine national emergency disp ute is mo re a political
than a legal problem. Anyway, for whateve r reason, re o rt to these emergency
procedures has declined through the yea rs. They we re invoked 27 times
between 194 7 and 1967, but only eight times since . There has ge nerally been
compliance with the injunctions that we re iss ued. O n nin e occasions (all
involving maritime or longshoring disputes) th e re were majo r strikes after the
80 days elapsed.
Under the RLA unions and employers are req uired to give 30 days notice of
an intended change in an existing agreeme nt. Th e Natio nal Medi ation Board
(NMB) then attempts to mediate the dispute. If med iation fa il s, the NMB will
suggest voluntary tripartite arbitration. If arbitration is declined a nd the NMB
be lieves that the dispute ' threatens substanti all y to in te rrupt commerce to a
degree such as to deprive any section of th e country of e ·se nti a l transportation
service', it notifies the President, who may appoin t a n eme rge ncy board to
investigate and report within 30 days . Afte r th e creation of uch a board and for
30 days after it has made its report to th e Pre ide nt, no unil a te ral chan ge may
be made in the conditions that triggered th e controversy . But just as with the
Taft-Hartley Act , the end of the RLA em ergency proced ure leaves the parties
free to act , absent further legislation by Congre .
IV . UNION COLLECTIVE AC TI ON AND E MPLOYER
R E SPO NSES

The NLRA guarantees employees the right to e ngage in peaceful strikes or
work stoppages for lawful objectives, including improved wages and working
conditions. An employer may not reta liate against strikers by discharging them
but it may replace them perm anently in o rde r to mainta in production.
Replacement is 'permanent' , however, only in th e se nse th at new workers need
not be laid off at the end of the strike to make way for the strikers. Strikers
remain employees until they obtain equivale nt emp loy me nt e lsewhere, and
they are entitled to reinstatement upon th e depa rture of the replacements. In
addition , former strikers presum a bly ret a in th eir se niority a nd recall rights as
job openings occur.
Although workers are protected against reprisals for strikin g, picketing, and
participating in similar 'concerted' action , th ere a re defi nite limitations on their
activities. They are subject to discipline or discha rge if th ey di srupt production
while a t work by engaging in slowdowns or inte rmitte nt strikes. That is also true
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if they violate the employe r's property interests through violence , 'sitdown '
strikes, or building occupation s. Furthermore, when a collective bargaining
agreement is executed , a union nearly always waives the right of the employees
to engage in a strike for economic reasons during the term of the contract.
Responsible unions do not lightly underta ke a strike. It can be draining on
workers, both financia lly and psychologically . Experienced leaders are even
more cautious about striking than ra nk- and-file members. Although a strike
authorizat ion is customarily voted upon by the membership, the greater check
is likely to be the requirement of a strike sanction by the parent organization.
Most nation al unions exercise control in some fashio n, either absolutely or by
withholding st rike benefits unless prior approval has been obtained.
A popular weapon of American la bor, much less used in Europe, is the
so-called 'seconda ry boycott'. A classic case occurs when a union attempting to
organize the Ace Manufacturing Company proceeds to picket Black Retailers,
asking the employee of Black to strike it as long as it continues to stock and sell
Ace products. T he standard a nalysis is th at Ace is the ' prima ry' employer, and
that the union i ee king to press ure it by enmeshing a ne utral or 'secondary'
party, Black, in a dispute of no concern to th e latter. The Taft-Hartley Act
amended th e N LRA in 194 7 to outlaw thi s archetypical secondary boycott.
Th e NLRB and the co urts have spen t the la t fo ur decades tryin g. with mi xed
results, to draw th e line between allowable primary activity and forbidden
seconda ry activity. As an illustration , a union is permitted to prese rve work
traditi on a ll y done in the bargai ning unit by forcing a n employer not to
subcontract it. eve n tho ugh this may indirectly affect so me woul d-be subcontractor much the sa me way Ace a nd Black were impeded in their dealings in the
prev io us example. The whole boycott problem can easil y be trea ted too
theore ticall y and morali tically , with insufficie nt attention paid to a pragmatic
balancing of union needs for effective weapons and e mployer or consumer
interests in freedom fro m injurious pressures.
The lockout, which consist of shutting down operations and withdrawing
work from emp loyee as a negotiating tactic, is often thought of as the
e mpl oyer' equivale nt of the uni on's right to strike. But th e lockout is accorded
no such explicit statutory protection as the strike , and beca use of its inherent
potential for impairing workers' organizational rights it has been handled much
more ginge rl y by th e NLRB and the courts. The US Supreme Court has now
e ndorsed th e locko ut a an offe nsive bargaining weapon in certain specified
circumsta nces, fo r instance , after an impasse in negotiations where there is no
threa t to th e union 's viability. In practice, however, the lockout is seldom used
except as a defe nsive meas ure to preserve the integrity of a multiempl oyer unit
aga inst a unio n's 'w hipsaw' (one e mploye r at a time) strike tactics.
Ove r th e years th e nature and incide nce of strikes have varied con iderably.
In the ea rl y orga nizing days of the auto industry th e ill egal sitdown trike
pl ayed a crucial role. Today it is nonexistent. Slowdowns a nd working to rule
a re no lon ge r popu la r, except occasionally in public employme nt where strik es
are genera ll y prohibited. The total work stoppage of indete rminate duration is
the conte mporary norm in American industry. Following World War II the
outpourin g of pent-up worker demand for better wages led to a nationwide
wave of strikes. In the wartime years less than 0. 1 per cent of total working time
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was lost through work stoppages. In 194 6 that fi gure leaped to 1.04 pe r cent,
the highest in the last h alf ce ntury. The reafte r st rikes decl ined sharpl y. Since
1950 time lost seldom approached 0.3 pe r ce nt except du ring the Ko rea n a nd
Vi e tn a m wa rs a nd the nati o na l steel strike of 1959 . Durin g most o f th e 1970s
a nd ea rl y 1980s work sto ppages accounted fo r onl y abo ut 0 .07 to 0 . 12 pe r
ce nt o f sc hedul ed wo rking time . In pa rt that ma y re fle ct a wea ke r and less
militant labo r move me nt. It may a lso mean man y uni o ns have learn ed that
th e threa t o f a strike is freq ue ntl y a more pot e nt a nd pract icab le we apo n
th a n the strike it se lf.
Mea nwhile, in th e public sector the tre nd of work ·to ppages was heading in
the opposite directi on. In a n ave rage year before 1960 th e re wo ul d be o nl y on e
or two doze n strikes involving at most three o r fo ur th o usa nd gove rnment
employees in the entire co untry, a nd the percentages o f lost work ing time were
not e ve n ta bul a ted. By th e mid-19 70 , strikes we re running a ro und 400 a ye a r ,
the work e rs invol ved numbered in the hu ndred of thousa nd , a nd th e
pe rce nt age o f tim e lost was a bo ut (J. 05 pe r cent. o r arou nd o ne-hal f of th a t
in the pri va te sector. T hi s me teo ric rise in the in cid e nce of pub lic e mplo yee
strik es occurred eve n tho ugh most o f t hL:m re ma in ed vio latio ns o r law .

V . I N DIVIDU A L GRI E V A N CES AND DISPU T ES OF
RI G HTS
A. GRIEVA

CE P RO CE D U R E S

The re i proba bly a greater simil a rity across the who le spect rum of industry in
the administration of collective ba rgaining agree me nts th a n in the ir initi al
negoti a tio n. Rega rdless of whe th e r th e principa l co nt ract is co ncluded at the
nationa l, loca l, or anothe r leve l, its app li ca tion o n a day-to-day basis in a give n
pla nt , sho p, o ffice , or oth e r unit wi ll be t he prim a r re po n ibi lity of the lo ca l
unio n a nd its full -tim e or pa rt-time office rs a nd bu sin ess age nts. pe rh aps aide d
by a pe rma ne nt staff person fro m the na tional unio n know n as th e ' inte rna ti o nal represe ntati ve ·. Jc In Am e ri can law a co ll ective ba rgaining agree me nt
i · o rdin a rily trea ted as a bin d ing cont ract. All its p rovisions co nce rning wages,
hours, workin g conditions, a nd even a ny no n mandato ry to pics t he pa rties may
have included a re ultim ate ly subject to judicia l e n fo rce me nt. But co urt
litigatio n is seldom necessa ry. Abo ut 95 pe r ce nt of th e ma jo r labor agreeme nts
p rovide th eir own grievance a nd a rbit ra tio n procedu re to re ·o lve di sputes ove r
contract inte rpre tations.
The scope of the matte rs subject to the proces may be coex te nsive with the
coverage of the contract, o r lesse r o r grea te r. Some tim e ce rta in ite ms will be
specifically excluded from a rbitrati on eve n th ough th ey ca n be the basis of a
grieva nce. T ypicall y th e re will be two to fo ur g ri e vance ste ps short of
a rbitrati o n. A grievance may be fil ed by a n affected e mp loyee or e mployees , a
union 'stewa rd ' or shop re presenta ti ve , or th e local th ro ugh its officers . The
first ste p is like ly to be a meetin g be twee n the e mployee, his sho p steward , and
12. la nv uni o ns ha v, mernhe r, in Canatla :1, \\', II a, the U nited Sta te ,. a nd arc the rd orc·
ca lled •int e rna tio na ls'.
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the employee's foreman or immediate supervisor. Next might come a
discussion between the chief steward or a member of the union's grieva nce
commi ttee and the genera l foreman or department supe rintende nt. Another
step would be a t the plant level, with a session in volving the unio n's grievance
chairman or the whole grieva nce committee and the plant's director of union
relations or possibly the plant manager or a n assistant. If the grievance covers a
major issue a ffecting numerous emp loyees, the first one or two steps a re
usually bypa ·sect. In large, multipla nt compan ies a final step often takes place
at the nati onal leve l. There will be a meeting or corresponde nce between the
director of arb itration or contract adm inistration from the corporation'
industrial re latio ns depa rtment and the chairma n of the union's national
arbitration board o r the head of its arbitrat ion departm e nt.
ny settlement that is reached will ordinari ly be in the form of an agree dupon int erpre ta tion of an ex isting contract term. Rarely will there be a formal
written amendment. The LRA permits but docs not req uire e mployers to
settle gri evances directly with individual cmplo, ces. without union int e rvention. Am· adjust me nt. howe er. must be cons isten t with th e collective
agreement. ,in d ti1e union must be allowed to be present to protect its interest s
and th ose of o ther e mployees.
Th e va t majo rity of th e dispute . that arise during the life of a collective
agreement are reso lved by the parties themselves through the grievance
procedure. If an iss ue is le ft un ettled, the union usually ha the right to proceed
to arbitration. U nde r so me contracts, however , at least a to pecified ma tte rs,
th e e mpl oyer must consent to each individual submission. Sometimes the
employer also is e ntitled to invoke arbitration. In a few in stances. as in
electrical manufacturing. certain contract provisions arc expressly excluded
from arbitration. but the union may strike over them once th e grie ance
procedure is ex hausted. without breaching the contract. In other industrie .
most notabl y co nstruction. traditional third party arbitration has never become
firml y es tabli ~hed as a means of dispute resolution. Unions with a n un sa tisfied
grievance cu:-.to ma ril y reso rt to the se lf-help of a strike. Where a contract does
not provide for arbitration as th e terminal grieva nce ste p. a direct co urt act ion
ordinaril y rema in s available.
The largest single category of grieva nces deal s with disciplin e and discharge.
About 80 per cent of all labor agreements provide explicitly (and other
implicitl y) that the e mployer may dismiss employee only for 'ca use' or •ju t
cause'. Ma ny la bor scholar have uggested this protection aga inst a rbitrary or
unfair treatme nt by ma nagement. a nd the grievance and arbitration machin e ry
which has been created to enforce the right, constitute the most significant
contribution that unions and collective bargaining have made to the welfare of
the Am e ri ca n worki ng per ·on, even more import a nt th a n economic ga ins.
Besid es discipline. othe r common s ubjects of grievance s includ e se nior ity.
promoti o ns. job clas ifications, overtime and other premium pay claims. and
managem e nt action s that dimini h the bargaining unit ' work. uch as
subco nt racting.
Most union-e mployer conflicts occuring during the term of a labor
agreement will pre ent a dispute of ' righ ts' rather th a n of 'i nterests'. Typically.
a n emp loyee o r th e union will be cl aiming that the e mployer has viola ted the
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contract by denying so me benefit th at has accrued or 've 'ted' in accordance
with th e agreement's provisions. Legally, however, a union reta ins the right to
demand bargaining over any man datory subj ect th at is not covered by the
existing contract and that was not disposed of in th e prior negotiations.
Dispute concerning inte rests or new contract term s are therefore entirely
pos ·ibl e even while an agreement is in effect. Sophisticated e mployer
negoti ators will try to avo id this by securing a so-called 'zippe r clau e' whereby
the union waives all right to seek bargaining over new matter during the life of
the contract.

B . PRIVAT E ARB ITRATION
Voluntary a rbitration has been defined as a contractual proceed in g whereby
the parties to any dispute or controversy , in order to obtain a speedy a nd
inexpe nsive fin al disposition of th e matter involved. select a judge of the ir own
choice and by consent submit their controversy to him for determi na tion. The
US Supreme Court has observed that whil e commercial arbitration is a
substitute for litigation , labor arbitrati on i · a substitute for industrial ·trife. The
increasing use in rece nt years of arbitration in the settlement of labor disputes is
a strong indication of a higher degree of maturity in industria l relations. Of
1,7 17 major collective agree ments analyzed in one study. for example , about
94 per cent provided for the arbitration of grievances betwee n the parties.
Today thousa nds of disputes are settl ed in voluntary arbitration proceedings
without reso rt to econom ic press ure or appeals to the sympathy of the public.
The courts in the United States have recognized the rights of em ployees and
unions under collective bargaining agreements. but co urt procedures are
ordinarily ill-adapted to the needs of modern labor-man age ment relations, and
in addition are costly, prolonged, and technical. One significa nt deficiency of
litigation as a solution to indu strial di putes was de cribed by a great pion ee ring
arbitrator, Dean Harry Shulman, in thi s way: '[LJiti gation results in a victory,
pe rhaps, results in a decision in any event, which disposes of the particular
controversy, but which does not affirmatively act to adva nce th e parties'
cooperative effort, which does no t affirmatively act to affect their attitudes in
their re lations with one ano th er. Arbitration can be made to do that.' Other
advantages of arbitration include the saving of time, expe n e, and trouble .
Arbitration permits self-regul ation by business and labor, since it is a private
rather than a governmental proceeding.
In grievance arbitration , or as it is ometimes labeled in contrad istinction to
' inte rest' arbitration, the arbitration of ' ri ghts', th e function of the arbitrator is
quasi-judicial. The arbitrator inte rpre ts and applie · the provisions of the
co ntract: generally he or she is preclud ed from adding to or detracting from
its te rms . Nonetheless. over th e yea rs a rbitrators ha e deve lo ped somewhat
dive rge nt attitudes about th e proper approach to the collect ive agre e ment.
Under a ·residual right s· th eo ry the e mpl oyer retains sole discretion to make
mana ge ri a l decision s affecting employees except as limited. more or less
exp ress ly. hy th e co ntra ct. U nder an •impli ed limitations" theory a union may

IT

D STATES

273

acquire ce rtain rights as a matt er of reasonab le infere nce from diffe re nt
clauses or from the instrum e nt a a whole. Views also va ry unde r both
theories abou t the weigh t the arbitrator should g ive to past practice and
barga ini ng history between the parties. o r to noti o ns of esse ntial justice.
Arbit ration tribun a ls take seve ral form s: te mporary (ad hoc) or permanent
a rbitrators; tripartite boa rd s, boa rd s composed on ly of neutral o r impartial
members. or a si ngle ·1rbitrator. Some industries, suc h as trucking, rel y on joint
union-employer committees, without ne utral participation. But the single
impa rtial arbitra to r is by far the m ost common. Today even a few nonunion
bu inesses are experi m e nting with unil atera ll y establishe d grievance and
arbitration procedures. Apart fro m private a rrangements made by the parties
direct ly with arb itrators , two impo rta nt so urces of ad hoc a rbitrators a re the
Ame rican Arbitratio n Association a nd the Fe deral Mediation and Conciliation
Ser ice. Both maintain panel s of qualified a nd avail a bl e arbitrator . The
parties th en make a e lection fro m li sts supplied upon reque t by th e AAA or
the FMC .
As arbitration ha ma tured , it ha suffered certain aging pa in s. Former
Professor, now Judge, H a rry T. Edwards has declare d th a t the process has
become ·too low and too expe nsive ' with too much ' uniformity' a nd
'codifi cation' and an ove rl y ' lega li stic' a pproach to day-to-day probl e ms. Thus
a normal case with a o ne-day hea ring costs a union $2,2 00 ; manage ment will
usuall y pa more. The average time from th e filing of the grieva nce to the
issuance of an award run abo ut two-thirds of a year. These problems may be
aggravated by the relucta nce of m a ny partie to u ·e new arbitrators. It is
estim a tecl that 90 per ce nt of tod ay's cases a re being heard by IO per cent of the
avail ab le arbitra tor · .

. PUBLI C PROCEDURES
I . LABOR MA

AGEM

T R ELI\ TIO

S (TA FT - H A RTL E Y) A

T

For many yea rs labo r cont ract were lega lly enforced , if a t a ll , in accordance
with state substa ntive law. It was often ha rd to sue a union in the state court ,
however, beca u e of th e difficulty of obtaining jurisdiction over an unincorpora ted a sociation under sta te proce dural rules. This be came a national
concern as a result of the many post-war strikes in the mid-1940 . Therefore , in
I 947, Congress wrote ection 30 1 into the T a ft-H a rtley Act to provide that
suits o n cont ract between union s a nd e mploye rs in industries affecting
commerce co uld be brought in th e federa l district courts. Union were
explicitl y made co mpete nt to ue or be sued as e ntities.
ection 30 1 wa probably design e d for th e primary purpose of e nab ling
e mploye rs to enforce no-strike clauses. Ironicall y, however, most of the
subsequent actio n were brought by union s to compel e mpl oye rs to comply
with a rbitration agree me nts or a wards. The US Supre m e ourt has he ld that
sectio n 30 I calls for the exclu ive a pplica tio n of federal ub ta nti ve law,
altho ugh la te courts retain concurrent jurisdiction over la bor contracts under
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th e federal statute. In th e famous S1ce/ workcrs 1.' tril ogy. the Supreme Court
delegated to arbitrators the principal responsibility for interpreting and
applying collective bargaining agreements. Courts are to order arbitration of
grieva nces unde r a contract ' unless it may be said with positive assura nce that
the arbitration cl ause is not susceptible of an interpretation that cover th e
asse rted dispute'. Moreove r, an arbitrator's award is to be enforced by a court
without review on the merits, so long as the award is not the prod uct of fraud or
beyond th e scope of th e submission. Avail able grievance and a rbitration
machin e ry has to be exhausted before there can be reso rt to a court uit on a
contract.
Employer may of course sue unions for money dama ge under secti o n 30 1
for violating no-strike agreements. (Offending individua l employees may be
disciplined but not sued for damages.) But the orris-La Guard ia Act
generally prohibits the federal courts from issuing injunctions aga inst peaceful
strikes, even strikes in breach of contract. In adopting sect ion 301 Congress
delibe rately rejected proposals to amend Norris-La Guardia to take acco unt of
this new development. Nevertheless, the Supreme Court has now declared that
this did not mean the injunction ban was left intact. It imply meant Congress
was prepared to leave to the federal judiciary the task of working out an
appropriate 'accommodation' between the two statutes. The Co urt 's solution
was to authorize federal injunctions against strikes where the underlying
grievance that triggered the strike is subject to a mand atory grievance or
arbitration procedure in a collective bargainin g agreement. i-1 While it may
offend purists in statutory construction , this rule has much to co mmend it in
elementary fairness. Norris-La Guardia was designed to protect struggling
unions against a biased and injunction-wielding judiciary, especially in
organizing settings. When an established union has committed itself contractually not to strike , and has been provided an effective a lte rnative means of
redress through arbitration , it is hardly a desecration of Norris-La Guardia
philosophy to grant the employer an injunction if th e union goe back on its
word and strikes.

2. R A ILW AY LABOR ACT

The RLA creates special machinery to dea l with the various kinds of labor
disputes. The NMB functions as a mediating age ncy in what we have described
as 'interests' disputes, and the National Railroad Adjustment Board handles
disputes concerning ' rights' . Adjudication of grievance dispu tes or disputes
concerning 'rights' by the Adjustment Board i voluntary in the sense that
appeal to the Board is apparently optional. But if either party does refer the
case, the Board's jurisdiction attaches and it is directed to dispose of the matter.
Upon failure of the carrier or the union to abide by an award an appeal ma y
l:l. S1erlworkrrs v. A111erica11 Ma1111jr1ct11ri11 g Co .. Y,3 S :i(>➔ ( 11)60) : S1,·,·hrnrt.Ns v. Warrior
& Gulf m ·iga1io11 Co .. 363 US 57 ➔ ( 1%0): S1el'i1rnrkers v. l:"t11e1pri.\l' Wheel & Car Corp .. 363
S 593 ( 1%0). See also A TT & T frc/1110/ogi es v. Co1111111111in11iom \Vort.crs. 10(, SCt 1 ➔ 1 5 (US
1986).
I ➔.

Bors M11rke1s. !11 c. v. Rl'Wil Ciffks Lorn/ 770 . :l'J8

S 2.,5 ( 1970).
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be made to the appropriate federal district court where the award will be
enforced or set aside. In th e dist rict court. ·the findings and order of the
division of the Adjustment Board shall be conclusive on th e parties·. except
for failure to co mply with legal requirements or for fraud or corruption.
In setting up the National Railroad Adjustment Board, Congress proceeded
on the basis of fifty years of experience with efforts to provide effective
methods for settling labor disputes in the railroad industry. The Board is
divided into four jurisdictional divisions, of which two have ten members each,
one has eight, and the fourth has six. The members are appointed one-half by
the carriers and one-ha lf by the unions, and are compensated by the parties
whom they represent. Because of the even division of members , deadlocks are
comm on. In the event of deadlock, the division may select a referee , but if it
fails to do so, the National Mediation Board designate the referee. The referee
sits with the division as one of its members and hears the case. The award is
written by the referee and mu st receive a majority vote, including the vote of
the referee, for adoption by the division.
The airline are covered by most of the provisions of the Railway Labor Act.
Title 11 of the Act provides for the establishment of special board of
adjustment and a four-member ational Air Transport Adjustment Board to
handl e grievances and di putes between air carriers and their employees over
the interpretation or app lication of the parties' agreements. The powers a nd
du tie of the ational Air Transport Adjustment Board are generally similar to
those of the National Rai lroad Adjustment Board.

1 . PUBLIC SECTOR

In th e initial stages of public sector bargaining, government employers were
re luctant to accept grieva nce and arbitration procedures similar to the private
sector model. That is explained partly by the residual influence of the
sovereignty doctrine and its denial of the delegability of governmenta l powers
to third parties. and partly by the belief that existing civil service appeals
systems rendered an add itional grievance procedure superfluous. This resistance faded with the withering of the sovereignty doctrine and with the growing
reali zation that civil service procedures, concentrating as they do on appointments, promotions, and other changes in employment status, leave many
important working conditions uncovered. Today over half of the labor
contracts of state and local governments provide for grievance procedures
capped by binding arbi tration. In the federal service, meanwhile , the position
has shifted all the way from an outright ban on binding arbitration in the
original presidential authorization for collective bargaining to a mandating of
it, with certain exception s, for all collective agreements under the 1978 Civil
Service Reform Act.
A number of jurisdictions, by statute or court decision , have osten ibly
adopted the US Supreme Court's Steelworkers standa rds for judicial revi ew
and e nforceme nt of arbitral awards in the public sector. That should mean
primary e mphas is on the integrity and legitimacy of the process, and littl e if a ny
attention to the substantive results except to ensure there are no violations of
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law. Yet an examination of the actual decisions in these jurisdictions seems to
indicate that the courts are in fact more searching in their scrutiny of public
sector awards, especially those granting moneta ry benefits. Apparently it is
difficult for many courts to submerge their feelin gs abo ut so und public policy
when dea ling with determinations affecting the operation and financing of
government. Indeed , several courts have been quite forthright in declaring that
they con ider a stiffer standard of review appropri ate in public sector
arbitration cases. Not surprisingly, that approach is likely to be even more
pronounced when a court is handling an ' interest' a rbit ra tion award.

VI. CONCLUSION

Collective bargaining in the United States, and the uniqu e system of voluntary,
decentralized, privately operated dispute resolution machinery that it has
engendered, reached a peak of growth and importance during the past half
century. Today organized labour is in decline . Unless it can pierce the barrier of
white collar employment in the coming years, th e future for collective
bargaining could be bleak. Already there are signs that gove rnment and
farsighted nonunion employers may be preparing to step in and appropriate
American unionism's proudest accomplishment, the grievance and arbitration
process. Yet the system would never be th e same without the active
participation and the creative contributions of th e work e rs o n the plant floors
and in the shops and offices. For those who esteem such participatory values,
there remains the hope that organized labor, like the chrysalis, is not moribund
but simply awaiting a rebirth. A transformed institution may e me rge, better
adapted than the one we have known to coping with th e job-related conflicts of
the professionals, technicians , and other high technology e mployees who will
inhabit tomorrow's post-industrial world.

SELECTED BIBLIOGR APHY

Bartosic, F. and Hartley , R. , Labor R elations Law in the Private Sector
( 1986) .
Bok, D. and Dunlop, J., Labor and the American Community ( 1970) .
Commons, J. et al. , History of Labor in th e United States ( 1918, 1935).
Cox, A. , Law and the National Labor Policy (1960).
Ferman. L.. ed .. ·The Future of American Unionism·. The A nnals 9-189
(May 1984).
Freeman, R. and Medoff, J., What Do Unions Do? (1984) .
Goldman, A. , Labor Law and Industrial Relations in the U.S.A., (2nd ed .,
1984).
Gorman. R .. Basic Text 011 Labor L1111
U11io11i::.atio11 and Collectil'e
Bwgaining ( 1976).
Gould, W. , A Primer on American Labor Law ( 1982).
Kochan. T.. Katz. H . and McKcrsic . R . . The h1111s/<Jr11111tio11 of' A111erirn11
/11d11strial Relations ( 1986) .
1

-

U

! TED STATE

277

Leslie, D ., Lahar La w ( 1979) .
Morris, ., ed., The Developing Lab or Law (2nd ed., 1983).
Morri s. C.. ed .. A 111erirn11 Labor Polin· ( 1987) .
Revnold~ . L. . Masters. S. and Mose r. C. . Lahor £co110111ics and Lahor

Rela1io11s (9th ed n .. 1986) .
., Hea ley, J. a nd Livernash, E., Th e Impact of Collective Bargaining
on Ma11age111e111 ( 1960).
Taft, P.. Organi;:,ed Labor in A m erican History ( 1964).
Wellin gton. H .. Labor and 11, e L egal Process ( 1968).
Slichter,

